



---

The Stoic Concept of Quality

Author(s): Margaret E. Reesor

Source: *The American Journal of Philology*, Vol. 75, No. 1 (1954), pp. 40-58

Published by: [The Johns Hopkins University Press](#)

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/291904>

Accessed: 02/02/2014 21:51

---

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at  
<http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp>

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.



The Johns Hopkins University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *The American Journal of Philology*.

<http://www.jstor.org>

## THE STOIC CONCEPT OF QUALITY.

The most comprehensive study of the Stoic concept of quality up to the present time was made by Rieth.<sup>1</sup> He was primarily concerned, however, with the evidence on Stoic philosophy to be found in the Peripatetic commentaries.<sup>2</sup> Aspects of this topic have received considerable attention from various authorities. The Stoic theory of mixture was discussed by Schmekel, Reinhardt, and Pohlenz.<sup>3</sup> The Stoic categories of disposition and relative disposition were treated in articles by De Lacy and Pohlenz.<sup>4</sup> I believe, however, that a detailed study of the fragments and of passages relevant to the concept of quality in the writings of the Stoic philosophers can cast new light on the problems involved.

Zeno, the founder of the Stoic school, recognized as first principles the active and the passive. The former was god or logos; the latter was matter without quality (I, 85). Primary matter was termed substance (οὐσία), and was divided into universal substance (ἡ τῶν ὄντων πάντων πρώτη ὕλη) and the substance of the particular (ἡ τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους I, 87). Universal substance was

<sup>1</sup> I would like to thank Dr. L. R. Taylor of Bryn Mawr College, Dr. F. Solmsen of Cornell University, and Dr. L. Edelstein of The Johns Hopkins University for many helpful suggestions. The fragments of the philosophers of the Old Stoa have been collected by H. von Arnim in his *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* (Berlin, 1921). I have referred to this collection by the number of the book and fragment e.g. II, 193. All references to the Pre-Socratics refer to Diels-Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 6th ed. (Berlin, 1951). For F. Jacoby, *Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker* (Berlin, 1926), I have used the abbreviation *F. Gr. Hist.* References to Simplicius refer to C. Kalbaleisch, *Simplicii in Aristotelis Categoriae Commentarium* (Berlin, 1907).

<sup>2</sup> O. Rieth, *Grundbegriffe der Stoischen Ethik* (Berlin, 1933).

<sup>3</sup> A. Schmekel, *Die Positive Philosophie in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung*, I (Berlin, 1938), pp. 250-2; K. Reinhardt, *Kosmos und Sympathie* (Munich, 1926), pp. 5-20; and M. Pohlenz, *Die Stoa* (Göttingen, 1949), I, pp. 72-3 and II, pp. 41-2.

<sup>4</sup> P. De Lacy, "The Stoic Categories," *T. A. P. A.*, LXXXVI (1945), pp. 261-3; M. Pohlenz, "Die Begründung der abendländischen Sprachlehre durch die Stoa," *Gött. Nachr.*, III (1939), pp. 185-8; M. Pohlenz, "Zenon und Chrysipp," *Gött. Nachr.*, II (1938), pp. 182-5; M. Pohlenz, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 69-70 and II, p. 40; Rieth, *op. cit.*, pp. 70-84.

everlasting and did not become more or less. The substance of the particular became more or less, or, as Stobaeus expressed it, it did not always remain the same but was divided or mixed (*ibid.*). In other words, only the substance of the particular was subject to growth, diminution, and qualitative change.<sup>5</sup>

Genesis was due to the presence of the active force within matter. As a seed, the logos was responsible for the birth of the four elements, fire, air, earth, and water (I, 102), and after the destruction of our universe by fire, it will again act upon matter and produce a world identical to our own (I, 107). God, we are told, runs through matter just as honey through the honeycomb (I, 155).

Zeno regarded quality as the disposition of a substratum, and referred to colors as the first configurations (*σχηματισμούς*) of matter (I, 91). Qualities and substances were mixed completely, and did not exist independently of each other (I, 92; cf. II, 411, 468, and 469).<sup>6</sup>

Zeno may have regarded the virtues as qualities. Plutarch attributes to Zeno the view that the virtues were "several according to difference" (*πλείονας κατὰ διαφοράς* I, 200), and yet at the same time were "one virtue differing in terms of its relations to its objects according to its powers" (*ὡς μίαν οὕσαν ἀρετὴν, ταῖς δὲ πρὸς τὰ πράγματα σχέσεσι κατὰ τὰς ἐνεργείας διαφέρειν δοκοῦσαν*). The words "several according to difference" may suggest that the virtues were individually differentiated and therefore qualities.

Such things as wisdom, soul, and moderation were considered to be causes and hence corporeal. Zeno defined cause as that because of which something happens, and argued that cause was corporeal (*σῶμα* I, 89). He stated that wisdom (*φρόνησις*) was the cause of acting wisely (*τὸ φρονεῖν*), soul (*ψυχή*) of living (*τὸ ζῆν*), and moderation (*σωφροσύνη*) of acting moderately (*τὸ*

<sup>5</sup> There is no evidence that Zeno distinguished between the substance and the quality of the particular in his treatment of growth and change. Compare Chrysippus and Posidonius, below, pp. 45 f. and 54. On this problem see E. Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, III, 1<sup>5</sup> (Leipzig, 1923), pp. 96-8.

<sup>6</sup> I, 92 *Ζήνων τε ὁ Κιτιεὺς ὡς τὰς ποιότητας οὕτω καὶ τὰς οὐσίας δι' ὅλου κεράννυσθαι ἐνόμιζεν*. The *κρᾶσις δι' ὅλου* was the complete or total mixture of substance with substance and quality with quality. The phrase was translated by Pohlenz, *op. cit.*, I, p. 73 as "total mixture." On the Stoic theory of mixture see above, note 3.

σωφρονεῖν).<sup>7</sup> Zeno defined the corporeal (σῶμα), which included the logos (I, 153; cf. 146), as that which can act or be acted upon (I, 90; cf. I, 98). If we could assume that the virtues were qualities, we might conclude that Zeno regarded quality as a corporeal cause.

There can be no doubt that Chrysippus maintained that quality was one aspect of the logos. He stated in one passage that the dispositions (ἕξεις) were air, and that air, the unifying cause (συνέχων αἴτιος) of the quality of each object which was organized under one disposition (ἕξις), was called hardness in iron, density in stone, and the white sheen in silver (II, 449). Qualities were called psychic breath and aetherial harmonies, giving form and shape to the matter in which they were present (*ibid.*).<sup>8</sup> The logos permeates animate and inanimate matter. It is mind, soul, nature, and disposition (I, 158). As disposition (ἕξις) it is present in bones and sinews and in the earth; as mind (νοῦς) it is found in the intelligence and in the aether (II, 634; cf. 1042).

The logos is the cause of the differentiation of the object, but since it permeates the whole object, it is present in the differentiation itself. The differentiation or quality, therefore, is the manifestation of the logos.<sup>9</sup> The logos is called a seed (σπέρμα I, 102 and II, 580), because it is not only the cause of its own development but possesses within itself potentially the quality of the fully differentiated substance.

Since Chrysippus believed that quality was a manifestation of the logos, and that the logos was corporeal (I, 153), he must have held that quality also was corporeal (σῶμα). Zeno defined the

<sup>7</sup> On the corporeal cause and incorporeal predicate, see below, p. 51. The later Stoics postulated four causes προκαταρκτικά, συνεργά, συνεκτικά, and τὰ ὧν οὐκ ἄρουν. On cause in Stoic philosophy see Rieth, *op. cit.*, pp. 134-55; W. Theiler, *Die Vorbereitung des Neuplatonismus* (Berlin, 1930), pp. 19-28; A. Schürenburg, *Die Kausaltheorie der Stoiker* (Bonn, 1921); and for cause in Posidonius, see L. Edelstein, "The Philosophical System of Posidonius," *A. J. P.*, LVII (1936), pp. 302-3.

<sup>8</sup> Zeno probably took over from medicine his concept of logos as a pneuma permeating matter (I, 146). On this problem, see G. Verbeke, *L'Évolution de la doctrine du Pneuma* (Paris, 1945), pp. 12-15; and W. Jaeger, *Diokles von Karystos* (Berlin, 1938), pp. 216-18.

<sup>9</sup> For the thesis that the different kinds of quality were determined by the tension of the logos (τόνος) see L. Stein, *Die Psychologie der Stoa* (Berlin, 1886), pp. 30-6; and L. Stein, *Die Erkenntnistheorie der Stoa* (Berlin, 1888), pp. 128-31.

corporeal as that which can act or be acted upon (I, 90). Chrysippus also seems to have considered that which is either active or passive as corporeal. He argued that soul was corporeal since it touched and was separated from the body (II, 790; cf. Cleanthes, I, 518), and again, that voice was corporeal, since all that was active was corporeal, and voice acted upon its hearers (II, 140). The argument in regard to voice was attributed to Diogenes of Babylon (III, 18), Antipater of Tarsus (III, 16), and Archdemus of Tarsus (III, 6).<sup>10</sup> We can conclude, therefore, that if quality in Chrysippus' philosophy was a corporeal logos, it was also a *δύναμις*.<sup>11</sup>

Moreover, if quality was corporeal, it acted as a cause. Chrysippus followed Zeno in asserting that cause was being and body (*ὄν καὶ σῶμα* II, 336). He argued that every object or event was predetermined by a series or a chain of causes, which was termed fate or logos. The quality immanent in the object may be the cause of an accident of the object or of some event which may happen to the object. Or again, it may act as a cause of an accident or event to some external object within its environment. Chrysippus distinguished between complete (*αὐτοτελής*) and initiating (*προκαταρκτική*) causes (II, 994, 997; cf. 974). For in-

<sup>10</sup> Various authorities quote the Stoics as arguing that matter which, of course, was passive, was body (*σῶμα*). Aetius, I, 9, 7 = Diels, *Doxographi Graeci* (Berlin, 1879), p. 308 writes *οἱ Στωϊκοὶ σῶμα τὴν ὕλην ἀποφαίνονται*. For passages which refer to matter as *σῶμα* see C. Bäumker, *Das Problem der Materie* (Münster, 1890), pp. 332-3. On the Stoic definition of the corporeal see also Schmekel, *op. cit.*, pp. 246-8.

<sup>11</sup> The concept of *δύναμις* is found in the medical writers, Plato, Aristotle, and Strato of Lampsacus. Frequently the *δύναμις* is both active and passive. In *Concerning Diet* (*περὶ Διαιτήσεως*), a treatise which is dated by W. Jaeger, *Paideia*, III (New York, 1944), pp. 36-40 to the middle of the fourth century B. C., fire and water are said to prevail and be prevailed upon (I, 3, 8-10; cf. *Ancient Medicine*, 13, 6-8). Further, in the *Sophist* (247E) Plato defined being as that which can act and be acted upon (cf. *Phaedrus* 270D and *Theaetetus* 156A). The passages on *δύναμις* in the medical writers and in Plato were collected by J. Souilhé, *Étude sur le terme δύναμις* (Paris, 1919). For further discussion see K. Reinhardt, *Parmenides* (Bonn, 1916), pp. 223-30, and F. Cornford, *Plato's Theory of Knowledge* (London, 1935), pp. 234-8. For examples of the use of *δύναμις* in Aristotle see *Cat.*, 9a14-27 and *Metaph.*, 1019a15-1020a6. On Strato see particularly fragments 42, 43, 45, and 48. The fragments of Strato are published in F. Wehrli, *Die Schule des Aristoteles*, V (Basel, 1950). The principle of *δύναμις* is discussed on pages 53-5.

stance, if a person should push a round body, the push would be the initiating cause, but the roundness of the object (its quality) would constitute the principal cause of the movement (II, 974). Similarly the quality of an object presented before the vision of an individual would be the initiating cause of sight (*ibid.*). In this case the quality of the object determined the quality of vision in the sense organ.

We must observe further that as a cause the quality was both active and passive. In so far as it determined an effect upon the object in which it was immanent or upon an external object, it was active; in so far as it was itself predetermined by a series of causes, it was acted upon.

Chrysippus' concept of quality as a disposition of the substratum affected many aspects of his work. The virtues were regarded as qualities which differed in essence from other qualities (III, 259; cf. 255), and which were at the same time a disposition of their substratum, the soul (*διάθεσις* III, 459; cf. Sen., *Ep.*, 50, 6). One of Chrysippus' books was entitled, *Concerning the fact that the Virtues are qualified* (*περὶ τοῦ ποιᾶς εἶναι τὰς ἀρετὰς*).<sup>12</sup>

Chrysippus' psychology was likewise based on his concept of quality and substratum. Perception, comprehension, impulse, and reason were qualities of the intelligence (II, 826; cf. 841). Perception was an affection (*πάθος*) of the soul (II, 54), and the soul was said to suffer a change of quality when it came into contact with the various sense objects (*ἀλλοίωσις* II, 55; cf. I, 58).<sup>13</sup> This means that color, shape, and form were not corporeal bodies impinging upon the senses, but a change in the disposition or condition of the underlying substratum, the sense organ or the soul.

Chrysippus' concept of quality made possible the four Stoic categories. The Stoic categories of disposition (*πῶς ἔχον*) and

<sup>12</sup> *St. V. Fr.*, II, p. 9, 41; cf. III, 259. The virtues were regarded as qualities in Arist., *Cat.*, 8b25-35.

<sup>13</sup> Aristotle (*Cat.*, 9b) referred to passive qualities (*παθητικαὶ ποιότητες*) as those which affect an object in some way, as, for example, the sweetness of honey affects the taste of the man who eats it. The affections (*πάθη*) likewise affect their object but whereas the passive qualities arise from a permanent disposition, the affections are derived from temporary conditions (9b28-10a10). Anger, for instance, may be due to the disposition of the subject or to a momentary grievance.

relative disposition (*πρός τί πως ἔχον*) are not found earlier than Chrysippus.<sup>14</sup> Virtue was the soul in a certain disposition (*ἡγεμονικὸν πῶς ἔχον* Sext. Emp., *M.*, XI, 23), and the soul was breath in a certain disposition (*πνεῦμα πῶς ἔχον* II, 806).

The category of disposition (*πῶς ἔχον*) raised further problems. A father who lost his son ceased to be a father. His difference in status, however, was due not to a change in his own nature, but to the loss of an external object to which he was related. The concept of father, therefore, was regarded not as a disposition of the substratum but as a relative disposition to an external body (*πρός τί πως ἔχον*). This fourth category of relative disposition was probably used by Chrysippus. It is found in a passage in Plutarch based on Chrysippus in which Plutarch argues that the parts of the cosmos are not complete in so far as they are in a certain relation to the whole (*τῷ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον πως ἔχειν* II, 550). Further, in a passage in Varro, Chrysippus is said to have argued that the word father had no meaning apart from that of son, and that the concept of right hand was likewise meaningless if one could not presuppose the left hand (II, 155). These examples may well illustrate the category of relative disposition.<sup>15</sup>

The substance of the particular and the quality of the particular were carefully distinguished by Chrysippus. In a passage in Plutarch, it is stated that each of us is two substrata. One of these substrata is substance (*οὐσία*), but the name of the other is missing because of a lacuna in the text (II, 762). Von Arnim suggested that the lacuna should be filled by *ποιότης*; Zeller supported *ποιόν*.<sup>16</sup> The one always flows and moves, neither growing larger nor smaller, and generally is not able to abide, but the other abides, grows greater and less, and suffers all the opposites. We should notice that both substance and quality, if, indeed, that is the word we should supply in the lacuna, are substrata, but that growth, diminution, and change of quality apply only to

<sup>14</sup> On the Stoic categories see above, note 4.

<sup>15</sup> These same examples, however, are found in a passage in Dionysius Thrax where they are relations (*πρός τι ἔχον*) but not relative dispositions (*τὸ πρὸς τί πως ἔχον*). See G. Uhlig, *Dionysii Thracis Ars Grammatica* (Leipzig, 1883), p. 35, 3 *πρός τι ἔχον δέ ἐστιν ὡς πατήρ, υἱός, φίλος, δεξιός*. For further discussion see Pohlenz, "Die Begründung der abendländischen Sprachlehre," *Gött. Nachr.*, III (1939), pp. 185-8.

<sup>16</sup> See above, note 5.

quality and not to substance. Division and mixture (σύγχυσις), however, take place in substance (II, 317).<sup>17</sup>

Two important passages in Plutarch's *De Communibus Notitiis* (1077 D-E = II, 396 and 1064), and Philo's *De Aeternitate Mundi* (48-51 = II, 397) provide important evidence for quality and substance in Stoic philosophy. These passages, however, are extremely difficult, and it is only with a great deal of hesitation that I offer an interpretation.<sup>18</sup>

According to Plutarch, the Stoics asserted that in one substance there may be two qualified objects (ἐπὶ μιᾷ οὐσίᾳ δὴ ἰδίως γενέσθαι ποιούς), and that the same substance, which has one qualified object, may receive a second and preserve both alike. He quotes Chrysippus as arguing that when our universe is destroyed by fire, Zeus, the only one of the Gods who is indestructible, will retire into foresight (πρόνοια), and that Zeus and foresight will be in one substance, aether.

The Stoic assertion that in one substance there may be two qualified objects (ἐπὶ μιᾷ οὐσίᾳ δὴ ἰδίως γενέσθαι ποιούς) is difficult to interpret, but Plutarch himself throws some light on the problem. He writes that the Stoics accused the Academics of believing that in two substances there is one qualified object (ἐπὶ δυνὶ οὐσιῶν ἓνα ποιὸν εἶναι). Plutarch points out that everyone believes that two substances may have one qualified object, and that the opposite is strange and paradoxical, if neither one dove is indistinguishable from another dove, nor one bee from another bee. It seems clear that whereas the Academics maintained that two doves were two substances with one quality, the Stoics believed that they were one substance but two qualified objects. The Stoics, therefore, must have used the term substance to designate the common factor present in all members of the genus, and the term qualified object (ἰδίως ποιός) to denote the particular differentiation of each member of the genus.

The passage in Philo is a paradox and may be paraphrased as follows. Let us suppose that Dion is whole-limbed and that Theon has lost one foot, but that Dion, in turn, loses his foot. Then Dion becomes Theon, but two qualified objects cannot be in

<sup>17</sup> See above, p. 41 and below, p. 54.

<sup>18</sup> These passages are discussed by F. H. Colson in the Loeb edition of *Philo*, IX (Cambridge, 1941), pp. 528-9. Colson, however, does not offer a solution for the problem.



the same substratum (*δύο ἰδίως ποιοὶ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὑποκείμενον οὐ δύνανται εἶναι*). Therefore, Dion remains but Theon is destroyed.

The statement in Philo, that two qualified objects cannot have the same substratum, appears to contradict Plutarch's assertion that two qualified objects can be in one substance. I believe, however, that the passages are not contradictory. If we apply our interpretation of the passage in Plutarch to the paragraph in Philo, we may observe that Dion and Theon were at first one substance (man), but two qualified objects, whole-limbed and footless. At the second stage, when Dion lost his foot, they are one substance (man), and two similarly qualified objects, footless and footless. They are, therefore, not one substance and two qualified objects, but one substance and one qualified object. This second stage Chrysippus seems to have regarded as impossible.

We have seen already that Chrysippus recognized two substrata, substance and quality. We can assume that a qualified object, in so far as it was qualified, was in the substratum quality. Therefore, Chrysippus' statement that two qualified objects cannot be in the same substratum (*δύο ἰδίως ποιοὶ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὑποκείμενον οὐ δύνανται εἶναι*) should mean that two qualified objects cannot be in the same substratum, quality. At the second stage of our paradox, when Dion had lost his foot, the substratum quality was footless, and Dion and Theon were two qualified objects in the same qualitative substratum footless. Chrysippus argued, therefore, that two qualified objects, each having the same substance (e. g. man), and the same qualitative substratum (e. g. footless), were not two objects but one.

There is one further problem. Why does Dion remain and Theon disappear? This can be answered easily. Theon was defined as lacking something which Dion possessed. When Dion lost that particular differentiation which distinguished him from Theon, Theon disappeared because his individuality was due to the fact that he lacked something which Dion had.

Evidence for the theory of mixture used by Chrysippus is found in many fragments. Chrysippus described four kinds of mixture. Mechanical mixture was the mixture of dry bodies whose surfaces were in contact (*παράθεσις* II, 471 and 473) such as a heap of grain or a pile of pebbles. Again, there is the mixture of dry bodies (*μίξις*) or of moist bodies (*κρᾶσις*) in

which the components of the mixture retain their own qualities and can be separated again (II, 471). The fourth kind of mixture (σύγχυσις) takes place when two or more qualities change into another quality differing from them (II, 471; cf. 317).

A composite of several bodies is mentioned in the fragments of Chrysippus. Chrysippus referred to a body (σῶμα) composed of separate bodies (διεστῶτα), such as an assembly, army, and chorus (II, 367), and probably mentioned this kind of organization again in another passage in which he spoke of the destruction of a substance by division into parts (διαίρεσις II, 317). Chrysippus, however, referred to an army or a choir as living, thinking, or learning (II, 367).<sup>19</sup> It is reasonable to suppose that a capacity to think and learn was the quality or disposition (ἕξις) of the army or chorus, and that an aggregate of this kind was regarded as an unified body.

Chrysippus' theory of mixture may have been influenced to some extent at least by Aristotle. His term for mechanical mixture (παράθεσις) corresponds to Aristotle's (σύνθεσις *De Gen. et Corr.*, 328a5-18). Chrysippus argued that during mixture (μίξις) the component parts maintain their own identity and are potentially separable. Aristotle regarded mixture as the combination of bodies which are capable of acting and being acted upon (322b21-29), and which combine to form a compound whose quality is different from the qualities of the component parts. The component qualities, however, are retained in the mixture and potentially can return to their former state (327b24-26). Strictly speaking the term mixture in Aristotle can apply only to the four elements.<sup>20</sup>

Aristotle, however, believed that the mixture of two unequal bodies in which the resultant had the quality of one of the bodies was not mixture but growth (328a24-26).<sup>21</sup> This distinction was not made by Chrysippus. Aristotle argued that a drop of wine is not mixed with ten thousand quarts of water, but loses its

<sup>19</sup> On this passage see Reinhardt, *op. cit.*, pp. 35-6.

<sup>20</sup> See H. H. Joachim, "Aristotle: Chemical Combination," *Journal of Philology*, XXIX (1904), pp. 72-86.

<sup>21</sup> Growth according to Aristotle was the increase of the existing magnitude by the addition of that which is potentially substance to actual substance (320b30 and 322a11-13).

form and changes into water (328a27-28). Chrysippus, apparently in answer to Aristotle, stated that a drop of wine could mix with the sea, since the drop by mixture might permeate the whole (II, 480).<sup>22</sup> It seems, therefore, that the terms *μίξις* and *κρᾶσις* in Chrysippus would apply to any combination of qualities whether the quality of the resultant was similar to that of one of the components or not, provided that the qualities kept their own identity.

Chrysippus may have used the term fusion (*σύγχυσις*) to designate genesis. There is no evidence that Chrysippus discussed genesis in terms other than mixture.<sup>23</sup> When the quality of the seed mixed with the moisture in matter, a being was born with qualities different from those of the seed and the moisture. Surely this type of mixture would have been termed fusion (*σύγχυσις*) rather than mixture (*μίξις*).

According to Alexander of Aphrodisia, the Aristotelian concept of mixture was adopted by some of the Stoics later than Chrysippus, and particularly by Sosigenes, the friend of Antipater of Tarsus (II, 470).

Active and passive elements were recognized by Chrysippus. He argued that all things are mixed from the warm, the cold, the dry, and the moist and that the opposites act or are acted upon (II, 411). The dark, cold is opposed to the brightness and warmth of the fire (II, 430; cf. 429). One element changes directly into another. Fire changes into air, air into water, and water into earth (II, 413). When freezing takes place, the air is active and the water is acted upon (II, 430). Galen, commenting on the interaction of the opposite elements, said that in Aristotle the qualities mixed together, but that according to the Stoic philosophers the substances also mixed together (II, 411). We can assume that Chrysippus treated the elements as substances but believed that the quality of an element, as, for example, hot or cold, when applied to a particular object, was the disposition of the substratum to which it belonged.

Active and passive elements were used by Posidonius also. The light and the warm acted upon the passive elements, the

<sup>22</sup> See also Pohlenz, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 41-2.

<sup>23</sup> Genesis for Aristotle was the actualization of the form which was present in the matter potentially (317b23-25).

heavy and the cold.<sup>24</sup> An element was able to affect other objects within its environment. The sun is said to be responsible for color, for the fragrance of fruit, the savor of juices, and the size and disposition of animals.<sup>25</sup> And again, the quality of the earth accounts for the characteristics of various kinds of springs.<sup>26</sup> The elements are responsible for human emotions. Blood is said to differ in warmth, coolness, thickness, and thinness. Those with warmer blood are more courageous; those with colder blood more cowardly.<sup>27</sup>

In one passage of Simplicius, Antipater of Tarsus, a Stoic philosopher who was the close friend of Tiberius Gracchus before the latter's death in 133 B. C., is said to have used the word disposition (*ἕξις*) to describe both the corporeal and the incorporeal.<sup>28</sup> If, like Chrysippus, Antipater believed that quality was a disposition (*ἕξις*), we must attribute to Antipater the theory of incorporeal qualities.

What was an incorporeal quality? According to Simplicius, the Stoics argued that the qualities of corporeal bodies were corporeal, and those of incorporeal bodies were incorporeal (*In Arist. Cat.*, 217, 32). The Stoics recognized as incorporeal that which is said (*λεκτόν*), void, place, and time. The quality of one of these incorporeals was itself incorporeal. A passage in Sextus Empiricus (*Log.*, I, 38-42) throws some light on the problem. It is stated that the Stoics regarded truth as a body (*σῶμα*) in so far as it was intelligence in a certain disposition (*πῶς ἔχον ἡγεμονικόν*), but considered that the true (*τὸ ἀληθές*) was not corporeal since it was a judgment (*ἀξίωμα*) which, in turn, was a part of speech (*λεκτόν*). We can assume, therefore, that the true was an incorporeal quality belonging to the genus of speech (*λεκτόν*).

<sup>24</sup> The fragments of Posidonius are published by L. Edelstein, "The Philosophical System of Posidonius," *A. J. P.*, LVII (1936), pp. 286-325. This fragment is published on p. 301, n. 61.

<sup>25</sup> *F. Gr. Hist.*, 87 F 114 = Diod., II, 51, 3 to 53, 7.

<sup>26</sup> *F. Gr. Hist.*, 87 F 123 = Vitruv., VIII, 3, 1-19 and 26-27.

<sup>27</sup> Edelstein, p. 307, n. 86.

<sup>28</sup> In Simplicius 209, 24 we read ὁ δὲ Ἀντίπατρος ἐπεκτείνει τοῦνομα τοῦ ἐκτοῦ μέχρι τοῦ κοινοῦ συμπτώματος σωμάτων καὶ ἀσωμάτων, οἷον τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι. This fragment is not published in the *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* but is quoted by Rieth, *op. cit.*, p. 56. On the corporeal and incorporeal quality see Rieth, pp. 55-6. Schmekel, *op. cit.*, pp. 624-7 sug-

It seems probable that the predicate also should be regarded as an incorporeal quality. As we have seen, Zeno himself spoke of a cause as the cause of a predicate.<sup>29</sup> He stated that wisdom was the cause of acting wisely (τὸ φρονεῖν), soul of living (τὸ ζῆν), and moderation of acting moderately (τὸ σωφρονεῖν I, 89). Archdemus of Tarsus stated that the causes were causes of predicates, such as "cutting" (τὸ τέμνεσθαι), or of propositions, as, for example, "the ship is" (ἡ ναὺς γίνεται). These predicates and propositions are termed "incorporeal actions" (ἐνέργειαι ἀσώματοι III, 8). Posidonius also argued that the cause was real and corporeal but that of which it was the cause was neither real nor corporeal, but an accident and a predicate.<sup>30</sup> Similar statements are found in later writers. Seneca (*Ep.*, 117, 2) wrote that wisdom is considered a good, and since the good is active, it must be corporeal. But being wise (*sapere*) is incorporeal and an accident of wisdom. According to Sextus Empiricus, the Stoics believed that every cause was a body which was a cause to another body of something incorporeal. For example, the lancet is the cause to the flesh of the incorporeal predicate being cut (ἀσώματου τοῦ τέμνεσθαι κατηγορήματος *Phys.*, I, 211 = II, 341).

In spite of the fact that the quality was itself the cause of the predicate, the quality was frequently regarded as characterized by or derived from the predicate.<sup>31</sup> Chrysippus, for instance, defined a logical proposition (ἀξίωμα) as derived from a proposition's having been made (τὸ ἀξιοῦσθαι II, 193). Similarly Simplicius spoke of those who derived the qualities from what are usually termed predicates (216, 19 ff.). Roofing is the result of having been roofed; equality is derived from equalization; and corporeality from the existence of body as substance (ἀπὸ τοῦ σῶμα ὑπάρχειν).

The Stoic interpretation of the universal or form such as man or horse presents some interesting problems. We have passages in Stobaeus, Aetius, and Diogenes Laertius which refer to the forms as concepts (ἐννοήματα). They are neither being (τινα) nor qualities (ποιά) but as it were a certain kind of apparition

gested that the Stoic source used by Simplicius in 209, 1 to 223, 11 was Antipater.

<sup>29</sup> See above, pp. 41 f.

<sup>30</sup> Edelstein, p. 302, n. 65.

<sup>31</sup> On this topic see Rieth, *op. cit.*, pp. 57-64.

of the soul (ποῖα φαντάσματα ψυχῆς I, 65). The source of these statements cannot be determined. Stobaeus has the heading Ζήνωνος <καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ αὐτοῦ>;<sup>32</sup> Aetius οἱ ἀπὸ Ζήνωνος. It seems probable that the source was early. Cleanthes is said to have argued that the forms (ιδέαι) were concepts (I, 494). According to Simplicius, Chrysippus was at a loss as to whether the form should be called being (τόδε τι II, 278). He believed that the forms embraced the genesis of the infinite in defined limits (II, 365).<sup>33</sup>

The term "common quality" was used at least as early as Diogenes of Babylon to designate such things as man or horse which Plato had termed forms.<sup>34</sup> The distinction between the quality of the genus and the quality of the particular, however, was made by Chrysippus. He spoke of the quality of a particular substance as "individually qualified" (ιδίως ποιός II, 396, 397, and 624), and distinguished between the quality of the genus and the quality of the species. In one passage, he argued that the generic pleasure was intelligible (νοητόν), but the pleasure of the species perceptible (αἰσθητόν).<sup>35</sup>

The term common quality is described at length in a passage in Simplicius (*In Arist. Cat.*, 222, 30 = II, 378).<sup>36</sup> Simplicius quoted the Stoics to the effect that the common quality (τὸ κοινὸν τῆς ποιότητος) was a differentiation of substance, not separable by itself, but ending in conception and property (εἰς ἐννόημα καὶ ιδιότητα ἀπολήγονσαν), not moulded by time or power (ισχύι), but by its own individuality (τῇ ἐξ αὐτῆς τοιουτότητι).

According to a passage in Sextus Empiricus, relation (πρός τι) and relative disposition (πρός τί πως ἔχον) were regarded by the Stoics as intelligibles (II, 80 and 404).

<sup>32</sup> The brackets were added by Diels.

<sup>33</sup> Compare Posidonius who defined the soul as "the form of the space in which is inherent a harmony of numbers" (τὴν ψυχὴν ἰδέαν εἶναι τοῦ πάντη διαστατοῦ κατ' ἀριθμὸν συνεστῶσαν ἀρμονίαν περιέχοντα Plut., *Proc. Animae*, 1023). On this passage see Edelstein, pp. 303-4, and R. M. Jones, *The Platonism of Plutarch* (Wisconsin, 1916), pp. 73-4.

<sup>34</sup> Diogenes of Babylon defined a προσηγορία as a part of speech indicating a common quality (κοινὴ ποιότης) such as man or horse (III, 22). On this fragment see H. Steinthal, *Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft bei den Griechen und Römern*, II (Berlin, 1891), pp. 238-42.

<sup>35</sup> II, 81 Χρύσιππος τὸ μὲν γενικὸν ἥδὲ νοητόν, τὸ δὲ εἰδικὸν καὶ προσπίπτον ἤδη αἰσθητόν.

<sup>36</sup> On this passage see Rieth, *op. cit.*, pp. 64-9 and 79.

Should such things as the common quality and relations be considered corporeal or incorporeal qualities? There is no direct evidence on which to base an answer to this question. But since neither the common quality nor the relation seems to have been used as a cause, they should probably be considered incorporeal.

I believe that we can perceive several stages in the development of the Stoic concept of incorporeal quality. The early Stoics recognized only corporeal quality and maintained that that which was not corporeal quality was not being. Chrysippus stated the principles of the Stoic categories, and probably recognized a common quality which he regarded as intelligible. At least as early as Antipater of Tarsus the incorporeal quality was introduced. It probably included the predicate, the common quality (the forms), and the categories.

In a discussion of the possible destruction of our universe, Boethus of Sidon, a Stoic philosopher whom von Arnim assigned to the period of the Old Stoa, mentioned three ways in which a body might be destroyed (III, 7). A composite body such as an army or a chorus (*διστηκότα*) or a body which is joined together (*συναπτόμενα*) might be destroyed by division (*διαίρεσις*);<sup>37</sup> or again a body might be destroyed by the destruction of the prevailing quality (*κατὰ ἀναίρεσιν τῆς ἐπεχούσης ποιότητος*). For example, wax that had been moulded into a figure might be smoothed out and the figure destroyed. Or the quality might be destroyed by a mixture which would produce a new quality (*σύγχυσις*). The word mixture or fusion (*σύγχυσις*) seems to be used with the same meaning that it had in Chrysippus but

<sup>37</sup> The terms separate (*διστῶτα*) and joined together (*συναπτόμενα*) occur in several passages in Stoic philosophy and show a remarkable consistency in their meaning. The term separate is used by Chrysippus (II, 367) to refer to bodies such as an assembly, army, or chorus. In Boethus of Sidon (III, 7), it refers to herds of goats and cattle, to choruses and armies; again, in Sextus Empiricus (*M.*, IX, 78), it includes armies, flocks, and choruses. Seneca also speaks of bodies composed of things which are separate (*quaedam ex distantibus*) and gives as examples an army, populace, or senate (*Ep.*, 102, 6). The word joined together occurs less frequently. Sextus Empiricus gives as examples of this kind of body chains, cabinets, and ships (*M.*, IX, 78). Seneca too speaks of a composite body (*composita*) such as a ship, a house, or "everything which is the result of joining separate parts into one sum total" (*Ep.*, 102, 6 *quorum diversae partes iunctura in unum coactae sunt*: R. M. Gummere in the Loeb translation).



whereas Chrysippus was discussing fusion from the point of view of mixture, Boethus was interested in the destruction of the component qualities which accompanied this kind of mixture.

Evidence regarding Posidonius' treatment of genesis and change is found in Areius Didymus.<sup>38</sup> Posidonius argued that there were four kinds of change, division (*διαίσεις*), qualitative change (*ἀλλοίωσις*), mixture (*σύγχυσις*), and dissolution from the whole (*τὴν ἐξ ὅλων, λεγομένην δὲ κατ' ἀνάλυσιν*). Substance can receive only qualitative change (*ἀλλοίωσις*); the other three kinds of change apply to quality (*περὶ τοὺς ποιоὺς λεγομένους τοὺς ἐπὶ τῆς οὐσίας γιγνομένους*). This sentence should be compared with the passage in Chrysippus which I discussed above.<sup>39</sup> Chrysippus had recognized substance and quality as substrata, and argued that qualitative change could apply only to the substratum quality, but that division and mixture took place in substance. Posidonius, on the other hand, maintained that a change of quality applied to substance, and division and mixture to quality. By asserting that qualitative change occurred in substance, Posidonius may have been trying to bridge the gap which Chrysippus had made between substance and quality. He seems to have believed that substance was indestructible. Posidonius went on to argue that the identity of the particular was due to the presence of a persistent quality from its genesis to its destruction.

We should notice also in this connection a passage in which Posidonius stated that God was an intelligible and fiery breath (*πνεῦμα*), not having form (*μορφή*), but changing into whatever he wishes, and being assimilated to all things.<sup>40</sup> We can assume, I believe, that quality in Posidonius' philosophy also was one aspect of God or *logos*. We might conclude that a capacity to change and be changed, or to act and be acted upon was a distinctive characteristic of God or quality.

The distinction between unified and non-unified bodies in Posidonius' philosophy presents difficult problems. In a passage which seems to have Posidonius as its source, Sextus Empiricus referred to bodies as unified (*ἡνωμένα*), joined together (*συναπτόμενα*), and separate (*διεστώτα* *M.*, IX, 78).<sup>41</sup> He defined unified

<sup>38</sup> Edelstein, p. 294, n. 35.

<sup>39</sup> See above, pp. 45 f.

<sup>40</sup> Edelstein, p. 291, n. 22. Edelstein argues, on the basis of this fragment, that God can only become accommodated to that which exists.

<sup>41</sup> See above, note 37.



bodies as those which are controlled by one disposition (*ἕξις*) such as plants and animals, and added that in the case of unified bodies there is a certain sympathy similar to that which exists between a finger and the rest of the body. When a finger is cut off, the body suffers. A little later Sextus stated that of unified bodies, some were bound together by disposition (*ἕξις*) as, for example, wood and stones; some such as plants by nature; and others, as, for instance, animals, by soul (*M.*, IX, 81). Edelstein attributed only the first passage to Posidonius and argued from this that only living bodies such as plants and animals were unified.<sup>42</sup> He supported his interpretation by a sentence in Cicero's *De Natura Deorum* (II, 82). Cicero writes that the world is not governed by nature like a clod of earth, a piece of stone or something of the sort with no natural cohesion (*nulla cohaerendi natura*), but like a tree or an animal in which there is order and design.<sup>43</sup>

If one assumes that Sextus Empiricus is using a single source for sections 78 and 81, a slightly different interpretation becomes possible.<sup>44</sup> In that case, since Sextus Empiricus makes only three divisions (*M.*, IX, 78), we must suppose that every body, which is not formed from separate entities such as an army, or which is not composed of parts artificially bound together such as a house or a ship, must be unified. This would mean that natural objects, both organic and inorganic, were considered to be unified.

Differences among unified bodies were, however, recognized by Posidonius. An important passage based on Posidonius in Diogenes Laertius has been translated as follows: "The world is ordered by reason and providence . . . Only there is a difference of degree; in some parts there is more of it, in others less. For through some parts it passes as a "hold" or containing force (*ἕξις*), as is the case with our bones and sinews; while through others it passes as intelligence, as in the ruling part of the soul."<sup>45</sup>

Our discussion of unified and non-unified bodies can be carried

<sup>42</sup> Edelstein, p. 299.

<sup>43</sup> The manuscript reading is *nulla cohaerendi natura*. Rackham, however, in the Loeb text reads *sola cohaerendi natura*.

<sup>44</sup> Reinhardt, *op. cit.*, pp. 45-51.

<sup>45</sup> R. D. Hicks in the Loeb translation of *D. L.*, VII, 138.

a step further by considering a passage in Simplicius (*In Arist. Cat.*, 214, 24-215, 2). According to Simplicius, the Stoics argued that the qualities were dispositions (*ξέεις*) but applied the term disposition only to bodies which were unified (*ἡνωμένα*), but not to bodies which were joined together (*συναπτόμενα*) such as a ship, or to those which were composed of separate entities (*διασπώτα*) such as an army. The result, as Simplicius points out, is that although all bodies are qualified (*ποιά*), only bodies which are unified under one disposition (*ξέεις*) possess quality.

A distinction between the qualified (*ποιά*) and quality (*ποιότης*) is made in another passage of Simplicius (212, 12-213, 7).<sup>46</sup> He tried to define the qualified (*τὸ ποιόν*), and by diaeresis divided it into movement (*κίνησις*) and condition (*σχέσις*), and the latter, in turn, into temporary condition and disposition. A disposition is a condition which has some duration and which is the cause of its own individuality and not dependent upon externals. For example, a man who eats food (*ὀψόφαγος*) can have this condition (*σχέσις*) only if food is available, but a man who is a lover of food (*φίλοψος*) has this natural disposition whether he has food at any given moment or not (cf. II, 393). The quality is the disposition; the qualified includes movement, and condition as well as disposition. Similarly elsewhere in Simplicius (209, 14 ff.) the term *ἐκτόν* applies not only to *ξέεις* but to movement and condition as well.<sup>47</sup>

Who was the Stoic who believed that not all bodies were unified, and yet identified quality with the disposition (*ξέεις*) of unified bodies? Such a distinction may have been made by Posidonius. Schmekel suggested that Antipater of Tarsus was Simplicius' source.<sup>48</sup> Antipater was, in fact, quoted by Simplicius in one passage (209, 24). The evidence is by no means conclusive.

Strong criticism of the Stoic theory of corporeal quality is found in a treatise entitled, *That the Qualities are Incorporeal*,

<sup>46</sup> On this passage see Rieth, *op. cit.*, 22-6 and 29-35; E. Elorduy, "Die Sozialphilosophie der Stoa," *Philol.*, Suppl. XXVIII (1936), pp. 102-7; Schmekel, *op. cit.*, pp. 624-7.

<sup>47</sup> According to Simplicius (237, 25-238, 32), the Stoics considered the *διάθεσις* more permanent than the *ξέεις*. The virtues were *διαθέσεις*. Compare *Arist., Cat.*, 8b25-9a13.

<sup>48</sup> See above, note 28.

which was published by Kühn as part of the works of Galen,<sup>49</sup> but was recently attributed to Albinus by Orth.<sup>50</sup> The writer of the treatise defined body (σῶμα) as a three-dimensional solid (τριχῇ τινα διαστὰν τὴν οὐσίαν ἀντίτυπον), and asserted that an accident cannot be corporeal. He raised problems regarding the divisibility of the quality, place and change of quality. The objections made against the Stoic theory are valid only if the Stoics defined body as a three-dimensional solid. The Stoic concept of quality was criticized by Plotinus also who likewise defined body as a three-dimensional solid.<sup>51</sup>

Did the Stoics regard body as a solid of three dimensions? It has been argued that the definition of a solid body given by Apollodorus of Seleucia suggests that they did.<sup>52</sup> Apollodorus defined a solid body (στερεὸν σῶμα) as a body of three dimensions (τὸ τριχῇ διαστατόν III, 6). In the same paragraph, however, he defined surface and line. I believe that Apollodorus is giving us a definition of a body of three dimensions as distinct from one of two dimensions, and that his definition has nothing to do with the corporeal as the term was used in regard to the Stoic concept of quality. In my opinion, the term "body" in Stoic philosophy designates a capacity to act or be acted upon, and not a three-dimensional solid.<sup>53</sup> This conclusion receives some support from another fragment of Apollodorus in which he argued that substance (οὐσία) and the limited (πεπερασμένη) were body (σῶμα), and went on to point out that substance was acted upon (παθητή), for, if it had been unchangeable (ἄτρεπτος), that which comes into being would not have come from it (III, 4; cf. Antipater, III, 32). I believe, therefore, that Albinus and Plotinus attacked Stoic philosophy, basing their objections on their own definition of body.

We may summarize our results as follows. Zeno recognized two principles, the active and the passive, and distinguished between universal substance and the substance of the particular.

<sup>49</sup> C. Kühn, *Claudii Galeni Opera Omnia*, XIX (Leipzig, 1830), pp. 463-84.

<sup>50</sup> E. Orth, "Les oeuvres d'Albinus le Platonicien," *L'Antiquité Classique*, XVI (1947), pp. 113-14.

<sup>51</sup> Plot., *Enn.*, VI, 1, 26 = II, 315.

<sup>52</sup> Bäumer, *op. cit.*, pp. 334-6 argued that the Stoic σῶμα was a three-dimensional solid.

<sup>53</sup> See above, pp. 42 f.

He regarded quality as the disposition of a substratum, and may have regarded the virtues as qualities. Like Zeno, Chrysippus believed that quality was the disposition of a substratum. Quality was one aspect of the *logos*, a corporeal *δύναμις*, and a cause. He distinguished between universal substance and the substance of the particular, and argued that growth, diminution, and change applied only to the quality and not to the substance. His concept of quality influenced his theory of virtue, and his psychology, and probably made possible the four Stoic categories. Chrysippus may have modified Zeno's theory of mixture by introducing the distinction between a mixture (*μίξις*) in which the component qualities are retained and a mixture (*σύγχυσις*) in which they are lost. The incorporeal qualities were recognized at least as early as Antipater of Tarsus. They probably included the predicate, the common quality, and the categories. Posidonius recognized four kinds of change, division, qualitative change, mixture, and dissolution from the whole, and argued that qualitative change involved a change of substance, whereas the other three kinds of change concerned quality alone.

MARGARET E. REESOR.